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CASE NOTES
types of insanity in which the insane person is not conscious of the con-
sequences of his act. The law, by not inquiring into the nature of the
individual decedent's illness when considering the suicide, but imposing an
arbitrary rule in all cases is not taking into consideration that knowledge
of insanity recognized by courts in other areas. 21  Eri .
ErieCahan
21 Lewis v. Lewis, supra note 19. See also Blackstone v. Standard Life & Ace. Ins.
Co. supra note 20.
TORTS-IMPLIED WARRANTY-PHARMACISTS' LIABILITY
FOR, USE OF MANUFACTURER'S SEALED PACKETS
John McLeod's physician prescribed for his use a drug known as
"Mer/29"' to control his body cholesterol. The drug was manufactured
by the'defendarit W. S. Merrell Co., and was sold to retail druggists in-
cluding International Pharmacies, Inc., and the James Drug Shop, Inc.,
for resale on a prescription only basis. Both of these drug stores filled
McLeod's prescription at some time and the drug was sold in the original
sealed packets in which it was received from the manufacturer. McLeod
was not warned by either of the retail druggists as to any possible inherent
danger from usage of the drug. The drug, when taken in the recom-
mended dosage produced severe side effects, which included the formation
of cataracts and other eye damage. McLeod brought suit against W. S.
Merrell Co. and joined the two retailers in a count charging breaches of
the implied warranties of fitness for intended purpose, merchantability,
and wholesomeness or reasonable fitness for human consumption. The
trial court ruled that a retail:'druggist does not warrant the inherent fitness
of drugs sold on prescription and dismissed the defendant retail drug
stores. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the finding of theCircuit
Court,2. but on the basis of impelling public interest the question was
certified to the Supreme Court of Florida. The, supremie •court. found no
evidence of a breach of implied warranty and affirmed the opinions of
the lower courts. McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965).
The uniqueness of the McLeod case is two-fold. Initially, it restates and
reaffirms what previous decisions have held to be the implied warranties
made by a druggist filling a prescription, and secondly the theory of strict
liability in tort, in relation to the liability of a druggist filling a prescription,
was discussed and rejected.
I For an interesting medical-legal statement of the history of triparanol, or "Mer/29,"
see Spangenberg, -Aspects of Warranties to Defective Prescription Drugs, 37 U. COLO.
L. REV. 194 (1965); and Note, 16 W. REsERvE L. REV. 392 (1965).
2 McLeod v. W. S. Merrell, 167 So. 2d 901 (Fla. App. 1964).
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The McLeod decision reveals that a druggist filling a prescription war-
rants that he will compound and deliver the drug prescribed,3 that he has
used due and proper care,4 that the proper methods were used,0 and that
the drug was not adulterated with a foreign substance.6 This is merely a
reassertment of the general liability of a pharmacist who compounds any
prescription.7 This liability, however, must be examined in relation to
certain other pertinent factors, such as the general scope of the implied
warranty of fitness for particular purpose and the implied warranty of
merchantability, and the correlation between the liability imposed upon
a retailer of food, drink, and other products intended for human consump-
tion, and that of a retail pharmacist.
As a general statement of law the implied warranty of fitness for par-
ticular purpose is conditioned upon the buyer's reliance on the skill and
judgment of the seller to supply a suitable commodity.8 The Supreme
Court of Florida was of the opinion that a patient-purchaser does not rely
on the skill and judgment of the pharmacist but places his confidence in
his physician who prescribed the drug, the physician in turn relying on
the representations of the manufacturer. 9 This opinion is diametrically
opposed to previous Florida decisions involving non-druggists, such as
Green v. American Tobacco Co.,10 in which the Supreme Court of Florida
imposed absolute liability on a manufacturer or distributor of cigarettes
for breach of the implied warranty of fitness and stated in effect that the
buyer was assumed to rely upon the seller's judgment in cases where the
buyer neither knows nor has an opportunity to know the fitness or un-
3 Corana Coal Co. v. Sexton, 21 Ala. App. 51, 105 So. 716, cert. denied 213 Ala. 554,
105 So. 718 (1925); Watkins v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 48 Ga. App. 38, 171 S.E. 830
(1933); Henry v. Judge and Dolph Drug Co., 211 Mo. App. 166, 245 S.W. 351 (1922);
Highland Pharmacy v. White, 144 Va. 106, 131 S.E. 198 (1926).
4 The degree of care required is high, commensurate with the risks involved: Mc-
Gahey v. Albritton, 214 Ala. 279, 107 So. 751 (1926); Watkins v. Jacobs Pharmacy
Co., supra note 3; Jones v. Walgreen Co., 265 111. App. 308 (1932); Tiedje v. Haney,
184-Minn. 569, 239 N.W. 611 (1931). However, it is still only that degree of care re-
quired of the ordinary pharmacist: Faulkner v. Birch, 120 Ill. App. 281 (1905); Beck-
with v. Oatman, 43 Hun 265 (N.Y. 1887).
5 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).
6 Ibid. 7 See Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 301 (1961).
8 HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 4 (1958).
9 But cf. Wennerholm v. Stanford University School of Medicine, 20 Cal. 2d 713,
128 P.2d 522 (1942) where the purchaser was held to rely on the representations of the
manufacturer even though the drug was prescribed by his physician; Wechsler v. Hoff-
man-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1950) where the physician was held to be an
agent of the purchaser for purposes of reliance upon the manufacturer's representations.
10 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963). See also, Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d
673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1963).
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wholesomeness." It is somewhat difficult to perceive how a purchaser can
be held to rely on the seller's skill and judgment when purchasing lipstick,
since the ingredients of lipstick cannot be determined without chemical
analysis, 12 and yet be held not to rely on the skill and judgment of a drug-
gist filling a prescription.
As to the implied warranty of merchantability, the court defines it as
a warranty that the goods are fit for the ordinary uses for which such
goods are sold,13 but conditions such warranty on sales to the general
public. Because the drug was sold on a "prescription-only" basis, the
merchantability of the drug was held not warranted to a retail purchaser.
Such a statement seems to have little or no legal precedent.' 4 The cases
cited by the court express the traditional definition of the warranty, and
while they hold a retailer liable for breach of warranty for the sale of
tainted food in sealed containers, they do not condition liability on sales
to the general public.' 5 It would be analogous to state that a seller of
handguns, in a city requiring a permit to purchase, makes no implied
warranty of merchantability due to the fact that he does not sell to the
general public but only to those having the required permit.
The Court's conclusions as to the law relating to breach of implied
warranties are not necessary to support the inarticulated premise that lia-
bility in this factual situation would be inequitable. Perhaps a better ra-
tionale for rejecting liability based on warranty in the case of a druggist
who properly compounds the drug prescribed, but which results in an
adverse reaction to the user due to the toxicity of the drug itself, was
stated by Professor Sprangenberg as follows:
An example of a drug of this type is triparanol, prescribed under the trade name
of Mer/29 and used to reduce blood cholesterol levels. This drug is presently
involved in widespread litigation because of the noxious side effects it has pro-
duced. The druggist who sold the drug would seem not to be liable under the
theory of warranty. Where the purchaser ordered Mer/29 and the druggist
supplied it, the only reliance placed on the druggist's skill would be a reliance
that the drug was in fact Mer/29 and has not deteriorated or changed in its chem-
istry by improper storage. The triparanol sold would be as fit for consumption
as all other triparanol, and as merchantable. The manufacturer, however, war-
rants not only that the drug is triparanol, but that triparanol is a substance
"' Accord, Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir.
1964); Lambert v. Sistrunk, 58 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1952).
12 Smith v. Burdine's Inc., 144 Fla. 500, 198 So. 223 (1940).
13 E.g., Carney v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 309 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1962); Sol-o-Lite
Laminating Corp. v. Allen, 223 Ore. 80, 353 P.2d 843 (1960); Hardman v. Helene
Curtis Industries, Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681 (1964).
14 77 C.J.S. Sales 327 (1952, amended by pocket part, 1965).
15 Food Fair Stores v. Macurda, 93 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1957); Sencer v. Carl's Markets
Inc., 45 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1950).
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reasonably useful for reducing blood cholesterol without causing new and in-
dependent disease. 16
In the thirty-five states which have adjudicated the issue' of strict lia-
bility for the sale of defective products intended for human consumption,
at least twenty-three, including Florida, have imposed strict liability. The
doctrine of strict liability has also been extended to goods intended for
external intimate bodily use, as well as to a wide variety of diverse prod-
ucts. Retailers have been held to liability identical to that -of a manufac-
turer in all states but three.' 7 It is considered of no importance that the
retailer could in no way know of or discover the defect,' or that it was
sold in the same sealed packages in which it came from the manufacturer. 9
While it is not mirrored in the case, the petitioner predicated his cause of
action on the contention that liability attached to the sale of defective or
unwholesome drugs as it does to the sale of defective pre-sealed or pre-
canned food, in that both are intended for human consumption, and
therefore falls under the doctrine of strict liability without fault.20 While
this theory was rejected in Florida, in Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laborato-
ries,2 1 this theory was accepted in holding a manufacturer liable for
breach of implied warranty as to the fitness of a polio vaccine, and it was
stated that due to the fact that the vaccine was intended for injection into
the human body, it was intended for human consumption in much the
same manner as food and therefore the theory of strict liability must be
applied.
The second important facet of this case is its approach to, and rejec-
tion of the doctrine of strict liability in tort as propounded in the Re-
statement of Torts.22 Concededly it would have been much preferred if
16 Spangenberg, supra note 1 at 196.
17 PROSSER, TORTS S 97 (3rd ed. 1964). Florida is one of these three states, and will
hold a retailer liable in cases involving unwholesome food, e.g: Sencer v. Carl's Markets
Inc., supra note 15, or in the case of other products, the retailer will only be held liable
if the injured party was a known and intended user; e.g., McBurdette v. Playground
Equipment Corp., 137 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1962).
18 Supra note 10. 10 E.g., Food Fair Stores v. Macurda, supra note 15.
20 Brief for petitioner, pp. 7-13, McLeod v. W. S. Merrel Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla.
1965).
21 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, supra note 5.
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS, § 402A (1965): "One who sells any product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the use of consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection
(1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relationship with the seller."
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the court had rejected this theory as a change of the law which must be
made by the legislature, as other courts have done in the case of liability
for the sale of tainted food.28 The court stated, however that it was in-
vited to impose strict liability in tort "without any basis for implying a
warranty."24 This statement is supported by the case of Whitely v.
Webb's City,2 5 which held that the breach of an implied warranty sounds
in contract, and cites the case of Spencer v. Carl's Markets, Inc., 20 bind-
ing a retailer of food on his implied warranty in the sale of tainted food.
While there is a strong trend to the effect that the breach of an implied
warranty gives rise to a cause of action sounding in tort, and not in con-
tract,27 it is important to note that warranty is of no consideration in the
theory of strict liability in tort.28 The warranty theory has involved
many complications and obstacles borrowed from sales law, therefore if
the term is to be used in conjunction with the theory of strict liability in
tort, the "warranty" used must be of a different kind than the warranty
usually found in the law of sales. The solution suggested by the Restate-
ment of Torts, that is the non-use of the term warranty, is the most direct
and liability under this approach is strict liability in tort.
29
It is finally stated in the McLeod case that even if Florida accepted strict
liability in tort the comments to the applicable section of the Restate-
ment of Torts exempt retail druggists from this liability. Comment k to
section 402A of the Restatement sets forth two instances in which a de-
fective drug is not unreasonably dangerous, thereby relieving the seller
from strict liability for injuries caused by it. The first case is the drug,
use of which is known occasionally to cause serious side effects, however
the disease sought to be cured is so dreadful that marketing the drug is
justified and the drug is not considered unreasonably dangerous. An ex-
ample of such a drug is Pasteur's rabies vaccine. The second group of
exempted drugs are those new and experimental drugs which, due to lack
of time and opportunity for sufficient experience, cannot be assured as
being safe; however, such experience as there is justifies marketing it, not-
withstanding a recognizable risk.
23 See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 17.
24 McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co. 174 So. 2d 736, 739 (Fla. 1965).
25 55 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1951). 26Supra note 15.
27 Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (1961); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 51 111.
App. 2d 318, 201 N.E.2d 313 (1964); Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining and Manufactur-
ing Corp., 80 N.J. Super. 184, 193 A.2d 275, rev. on other grounds 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d
826 (1963); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81
(1963).
28 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962); Van-
dermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964). See also, PROSSER,
op. cit. supra note 17.
29 See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 17. See also supra note 22, comment m.
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The above-stated exceptions to strict liability in tort must be considered
in light of the fact that the exemption is conditioned on giving proper
warning when necessary.30 Warnings were usually sent with "Mer/29" to
the administering physician and the pharmacist. Such warnings did not
mention the possibility of formation of cataracts.31 The record of the case
and the briefs of the parties only reveal that McLeod was not warned by
either of the retail druggists. Whether such warnings were in fact received
by the pharmacists or McLeod's physician is not disclosed. Therefore,
any statement in regard to this case would be conjectural.
Of more importance is the fact that "Mer/29" does not fit into either
category of exempted drugs under Section 402A. It was not a fully devel-
oped drug which had known propensities, so as to fall into the first classi-
fication. "Mer/29" fell into the class of a new, experimental drug, but it
did not meet the necessary requirements for release to the public. There
was no evidence justifying release, and there were known risks from its
use. Food and Drug Administration rules requiring disclosure of adverse
test results were violated, the original animal test data submitted was falsi-
fied, and adverse effects appeared during testing. Clearly it can not be said
that available experience justified marketing the drug, in spite of this the
drug was released in utter disregard of public health.32
In conclusion, it must be pointed out that the McLeod decision will
make its effect felt on the fledgling doctrine of strict liability in tort in
both a general and specific manner. Generally, most courts in recent de-
cisions, when squarely faced with this issue in a products liability case,
have decided the case on the basis of the older, confused warranty theory 33
as did the court to some degree in this case. The difference is that while
other courts have cited the Restatement and the California decisions
adopting it 34 in passing, the McLeod case rejects the doctrine specifically
as few other courts have done, and thereby stands as a reversal of the aims
of the drafting members of the American Law Institute and Dean Prosser,
the reporter. Needless to say, due to the lack of decisions clearly passing
on the doctrine of strict liability in tort, this case will yield weight to its
rejection in litigation in other jurisdictions.
Specifically, while it is only dicta, we now have for the first time a
30 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 17; See also, supra note 22, comment k.
31 See Note, supra note 1.
32 Hearings on Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation before
the Subcommittee on Reorganization and International Organizations of the Committee
on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 1955-78 (1963); Flexman,
MER/29 (Triparanol) and Cataract, MFD. TRIAL TEcH. Q. 11 (Dec. 1963). See also,
supra note 1.
38 See Note, 14 DEPAuL L. REv. 488 (1965).
84 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra note 28; Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co., supra note 28.
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judicial interpretation of comment k to section 402A of the Restatement.
This interpretation clearly exempts retail druggists who properly fill a
prescription from the wide ambit of "sellers" sought to be included in the
coverage of section 402A. The court in the McLeod case expressed the
view that druggists as a generic group are not included within the cover-
age of section 402A, and therefore it was not necessary to decide whether
a druggist performs a service, as claimed by the defendants, or is a seller.
However, the fact remains that the court excluded a specific group from




An action was brought by an unemancipated eleven year old minor
against his father for injuries sustained when he was struck by an auto
driven by his intoxicated father. In the trial court, the judge ruled that
an unemancipated minor could not sue his parent in tort, and the action
was dismissed.' The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed the trial court and
held that the minor could recover, since the defendant, who drove while
intoxicated and at high speed, was guilty of wilful and negligent conduct.
Teramano v. Teramano, 1 Ohio App. 2d 504, 205 N.E.2d 586 (1965).
In reversing the trial court, the court of appeals disregarded the de-
fendant's plea of Parental Immunity, a doctrine first established without
precedent in Hewlett v. George,2 which involved a wilful tort. In the
Hewlett case, the Parental Immunity doctrine was established on the
basis of the court's interpretation of public policy.3 The court refused to
put family harmony in jeopardy by allowing a daughter, under her par-
ent's control, the right to recover from her parent. Since 1891, courts
dealing with suits between parents and children have had to cope with
the Hewlett doctrine that a child may not sue his parent in tort. Many
courts have applied it strictly, some have excused themselves from its
scope due to particular circumstances, and a few have almost entirely
abrogated it.
1 Teramano v. Teramano, 1 Ohio App. 2d 504, 505, 205 N.E.2d 586, 487. In the Com-
mon Pleas Court the defendant was granted judgment after a motion for a Directed
Verdict at the conclusion of plaintiff's opening statement.
268 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). Action was on behalf of an unemancipated minor
against her mother for having, "Willfully, illegally, and maliciously caused her to be
imprisoned for ten days in the East Mississippi insane asylum." (ld. at 704, 9 So. at 886.)
3 Id. at 711, 9 So. at 886: "But as long as the parent is under obligation to care for
[the minor] the best interests of society forbid to the minor child a right to appear in
court." It is of particular interest to note that in this case, the parent publically de-
nounced and rejected the child, and thus, no family harmony existed to be preserved.
